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Abstract
We consider a vertical supply chain in which a monopoly retailer produces a good by
assembling a number of essential components each of which is owned by a monopoly.
Rather than making the common assumption that the component price is set in the
same way for each owner, we investigate the possibility that the retailer may profit
by bargaining with some owners in a group, whilst others set their component price
to maximize own profit. Furthermore, component owners can self-select into one
of these groups, and the retailer can affect group formation by adjusting the order
of negotiations. We present conditions under which the retailer can encourage the
formation of a bargaining group, and thereby improve its own and industry profit.
Keywords Complementary inputs · Bargaining · Supply chain
JEL Classification C78
1 Introduction
Modern production often involves assembly of many components, and a successful
supply chain is dependent upon agreement between many actors.1 Negotiations in
the chain may be difficult since they embody both the aspect of creating value in the
chain, and distributing value between its members (Lax and Sebenius 1992). In an
experimental analysis of bargaining in competing supply chains, Leider and Lovejoy
(2016) note that the benefit of creating value through cooperation will not necessarily
be realized due to the private profitability interests of each participant. Furthermore,
they claim that managing the tension between integrative and distributive bargaining is
1 Laussel (2008) documents that Airbus Industries has 600 subcontractors that provide equipment for
aeroplane manufacture.
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central to supply chainmanagement research. In this paperwe analyze a simple vertical
market in which amanufacturer or retailer must assemble complementary components
in order to satisfy product demand. In the status quo situation, all component owners
set their component price independently to maximize own profit, and hence claim
as much value as possible for themselves. We show that a simple cooperative group
bargaining process over the component prices can increase the amount of profits to be
distributed in the industry; when component owners have heterogeneous bargaining
power, however, some prefer to not bargain in the group but to maximize individual
profit. The retailer then attempts to move the situation away from the status quo by
designing the negotiation context. Specifically, the retailer does not have the power to
command that all component owners negotiate as part of the group, but he can design
the timing of the negotiations by stipulating that those who bargain as a group can set
their component prices before, after or at the same time as those who set component
price to maximize own profit. We present conditions under which the retailer can
announce an order of negotiation that leads to the formation of a unique bargaining
group, which in turn leads to greater profit for the retailer than the status quo of
independent profit maximization. The formation of a group that negotiates together is
documented in practice by Nagarajan and Bassok (2008) who give several examples
in which a selling alliance arises in supply chains, with some actors bundling their
components and selling a kit to the retailer; this is reported to occur in aeroplane
manufacture, agribusiness and in the semiconductor industry among others.2
The setting of intermediate prices in a supply chain has been modeled in many
ways. Some authors consider our status quo situation in which the owners choose their
component price to maximize own profit, given the expected price set by retailers for
the final product (see for example Choi 1991). Others consider that bargaining between
chain members will determine an intermediate price (Horn and Wolinsky 1988; von
Ungern-Sternberg 1996; Dobson and Waterson 1997, were early examples of this).
In many cases, the bargaining is modeled as the bilateral maximization of the Nash
product, modified for bargaining power (for example Laussel 2008; Nagarajan and
Bassok 2008; Spulber 2016, 2017; Draganska et al. 2010 and Sheu and Gao 2014).3
A common assumption in supply chain analysis is that all actors determine their price
in the samemanner, i.e. all actors strike a bilateral bargainwith the downstreamfirm, or
all set a linear price or two-part tariff to maximize own profit.We relax this assumption
in our analysis, allowing some component owners to bargain, and others to set price
to maximize own profit.
In bargaining models, a common assumption is that each supplier has identical
bargaining strength (see, for example, Laussel 2008; Spulber 2017 and Nagarajan and
Bassok 2008). This is unlikely to be the case, and is an assumption that we relax in
our analysis.4 Bargaining strength may follow from the skill of the negotiator, may be
related to the characteristics of the component, or arise from strategic considerations
2 See Nagarajan and Bassok (2008; p. 1483).
3 Clark and Pereau (2009) consider bargaining with alternating offers as in Rubinstein (1982).
4 Spulber (2017) notes that in 2015 US companies had 72,000 purchasing managers and over 400,000
buyers who evaluate suppliers and negotiate supply contracts. It seems unlikely that they would be identical.
Elfenbein et al. (2008) present evidence of experiments in an integrative bargaining environment suggesting
that differences in individual skill affects the bargaining outcome.
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involving partial commitment (Muthoo 1996). An extensive review of the sources and
consequences of asymmetric bargaining power can be found in Winkler (2006). In
our model, the heterogeneity of bargaining strength plays a crucial role since those
with the most power can gain a large profit from joining the bargaining group, while
component owners with little bargaining power prefer to set intermediate price to
maximize own profit. A configuration of component owners in and outside of the
bargaining group has to exhibit stability in equilibrium, in the sense that no member
wants to leave the group, and no outsider wishes to join (D’Aspremont et al. 1983).
We consider open membership in which no component owner can refuse others the
right to join the bargaining group (see Belleflamme 2000; Yi 1997, for a survey).
The paper closest to ours is Nagarajan and Bassok (2008) who analyze a supply
chainwith complementary components in which identical suppliers bargain bilaterally
in sequence over division of a fixed pie with a retailer, and who can form coalitions in
order to increase collective bargaining power in the process; they can furthermore use
resources to influence their place in the bargaining order. In our model, the component
prices affect the cost of the retailer and hence the product price which alters demand;
hence, component owners must take account of this effect when setting the price of
their component. Our framework allows some component owners to bargain over its
own intermediate price collectively in a group with others, whilst some components
are outside of the arrangement with the component price being set to maximize the
profit of an individual owner.5 The bargaining that takes place in our model involves
maximization of the joint product of the participants’ profit, rather than bilaterally in
sequence.6 In determining the composition of the components in the bargaining group
endogenously, our work is also related to that of coalition formation. The literature
distinguishes between coalitions in collusive markets (Stigler 1950) in which coalition
formation induces a positive externality on the firms outside of the cartel by restricting
production and increasing prices; coalitions in cost-reducingmarkets on the other hand
induce a negative externality on non-members since the competitive position of the
cartel is strengthened (Bloch 2002;Belleflamme2000).Often simplifying assumptions
will have to be made when considering endogenous coalition formation. As Brenner
(2009; 386) puts it: “The design of optimal coalition formation rules is a neglected issue
in economic theory, in part because the analytical complexities which may arise when
considering optimal endogenous coalition formation”. Brenner (2009) considers a
symmetric game inwhichonly a single coalition forms in order to secure an analytically
tractable model. We also consider the case in which a single coalition can form.7
Asymmetry in coalition formation is examined by Belleflamme (2000) who considers
firms that can form cost-reducing cartels prior to competition. The asymmetry has two
dimensions, one relating to the firm itself and one relating to the association to which
the firm is attached, i.e. that the cost reductionmay be relationship-specific.He restricts
the number of coalitions that can form to at most two. When firms are symmetric, the
5 This split system is also considered by Leveque and Meniere (2011) in the context of patents in which
some patent holders form a pool, whilst others remain outside as independent licensors.
6 Given the large number of components that are involved in some supply chains, it is not unlikely that
some negotiations will take place simultaneously.
7 See Bloch (2002) for a model of sequential coalition formation in collusive and cost-reducing markets,
in which several coalitions may form.
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unique equilibrium involves the formation of the grand coalition, whereas when firms
are asymmetric there may be no equilibrium coalition, or several coalitions may form.
Nagarajan and Bassok (2008) also allow for the possibility that several coalitions may
form in their model with symmetric suppliers who all participate in bargaining. Since
we allow for asymmetric suppliers and a mixed system of price setting, we restrict the
number of coalitions that may form to one in order to get tractable results.
In our model, the retailer can effect the formation of the bargaining group by
announcing the order in which he will negotiate with those who bargain and those who
set component price independently. If component owners who set price independently
get to do this first, then no bargaining group will form. Those who negotiate first
take too large a share of the profits from the market to make cooperation worthwhile.
Simultaneous negotiation with independent component owners and the bargaining
group gives the same result when there are at least three component owners. Hence the
retailer cannot move the market solution away from the status quo in which all owners
maximize their ownprofit. In the special case of twocomponents, the owners can forma
bargaining group if they have sufficiently high and sufficiently close bargaining power;
in this case, the possibility exists that the retailer can then achieve the fully cooperative
solution, increasing profit for all participants over the status quo.We show that allowing
the bargaining group to negotiate component price before the independent owners can
lead to the formation of a stable bargaining group. However, without more structure on
the group formation problem, the group of owners that bargain will not be unique. We
recover uniqueness by assuming that component owners enter the bargaining group
sequentially in the order of their bargaining power, and demonstrate the existence of a
stable bargaining group that improves the profit of the retailer compared to the status
quo.
Several strands of literature on one-to-many negotiation are related to our work.
Some authors consider the effect of merger and concentration in the vertical sup-
ply chain (e.g. Gaudin 2018; Iozzi and Valletti 2014; Bergh et al. 2020). Bundling
complementary components, or the formation of patent pools are examples of these
types of analysis (see for example Flores-Fillol andMoner-Colonques 2011; Reisinger
and Tarantino 2019). Patent pools function differently to the model that we present
since patent owners negotiate collectively, and then divide up profits according to a
pre-specified rule; in our model, component owners bargain together but receive an
individual share of the profit decided by their bargaining power.
The sequencing of negotiations is also relevant to our work. Münster and Reisinger
(2018) investigate a model in which a principal bargains bilaterally with two agents
who have different bargaining power. The principal chooses which agent to bargain
with first, focusing on the case in which no renegotiation is possible. They show that
welfare is maximized when the stronger agent bargains first, and this also maximizes
the return of the principal if there is a negative externality between the agents in the
bargaining situation (retailers who sell substitute products for example). This analysis
adaptsMöller (2007)whoassumes that the principal has all of the bargainingpower and
can choose between simultaneous and sequential offers; if the externalities between
agents become weaker the more an agent trades, then simultaneous bargaining is
preferred by the principal. Sequential negotiations can be beneficial for the principal
if the amount of trading increases the externality between agents since this lowers the
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outside option of those who contract later in the sequence. Xiao (2018) endogenizes
the sequence of bargaining in a model with a buyer who negotiates with several sellers
of complementary goods, showing that he prefers to negotiate with small sellers (low
valuation) first. Krasteva and Yildirim (2012) consider two sellers of complementary
goods who do not know the buyer’s the stand-alone value of their products. Indeed, the
buyer must choose the sequence of negotiations before privately learning these stand-
alone values, and each negotiation is modeled as a random-proposer one-shot bargain.
The bargaining power of the seller relative to the buyer is given by the probability of the
seller making the offer. When bargaining in sequence, if the buyer proposes, he offers
to pay the second seller his marginal cost. If sellers have diverse bargaining power and
the weak seller negotiates last, then the stronger seller will act aggressively if allowed
to bargain first; the buyer prefers to counteract this and begin with the weaker seller.
When both sellers have high bargaining power, the buyer prefers to negotiate with
the stronger one first; should the buyer agree with the stronger seller first, it is more
likely that he will be able to agree with the weaker seller at the second stage, gaining
the payoff from combining the complementary goods. Krasteva and Yildirim (2019)
extend this framework to allow the buyer to acquire information on the stand-alone
values before announcing the sequence of negotiation.
The paper is organized as follows. The basic model is set up in Sect. 2, where we
solve for two benchmark cases: one inwhich all component owners set their intermedi-
ate price to maximize own profit, and one in which all component owners bargain with
the retailer, setting component price cooperatively by maximizing the Nash product.
Section 3 investigates the situation that arises when some component owners bargain
over their component price while others set it independently to maximize own profit.
These results are used in Sect. 4 to examine conditions under which the retailer can
design the order of negotiations in order to influence the formation of a stable bargain-
ing group, with the aim of increasing his own profit from the sale of the final product.
Section 5 concludes. Proofs are collected in the “Appendix”.
2 Themodel
There are i = 1, . . . , n component owners who each own the exclusive right to
that component. As in the Cournot model of complementary monopolies, these firms
supply their component to a single downstream retailer who in turn must assemble
one unit of each component part to make a single unit of the final product for which
demand is given by
D(p) = 1 − p (1)
where p is the product price. The retailer is the only seller of this product, and pays a
component price to owner i at a rate of wi per unit; due to the technology, the number
of units sold of the component is equal to the number of units sold of the final product.
For simplicity we assume that the retailer incurs no other production cost. Hence the
profits of each component owner, and the retailer R are given by
πi = wi (1 − p) (2)
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The retailer sets a product price to maximize his profit given the component priceswi :
∂πR
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Inserting (4) into (2) and (3) gives the profit function of monopoly i , the retailer and
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Note that retailer and industry profit is dependent only on the sum of the component
prices. We now investigate two benchmark solutions, one in which the actors do not
cooperate, and one in which they cooperate by striking a Nash bargain.
Lemma 1 indicates the market solution assuming that each monopoly component
owner sets its price independently to maximize its own profit; here we indicate the
equilibrium value by an I superscript.
Lemma 1 When each monopoly component owners sets intermediate price to maxi-
mize own profits, the equilibrium is characterized by
w I = 1
1 + n , (8)
π Ii =
1
2 (1 + n)2 , (9)
π IR =
1
4 (1 + n)2 , (10)
π I = nπ Ii + π IR =
1 + 2n
4 (1 + n)2 , (11)
pI = 1 + 2n
2 (1 + n) . (12)
Since each component is essential for production, and the technology requires one
unit of each, the intermediate price set is identical for each component, and decreasing
in the number of components.
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Suppose that the component owners and the retailer seek a cooperative solution,
determining the intermediate prices by bargaining. Specifically, assume that the actors
maximize a Nash program with bargaining power of the retailer denoted r and that
of owner i by mi , collected in vector m. Let M = ∑nj=1m j , and W = ∑nk=1 wk .8
Using (5) and (6), the Nash program—denoted by  and given that all component














m j . (13)
Lemma 2 gives the equilibrium values in the cooperative bargaining solution,
denoted by C :
Lemma 2 Maximizing the Nash program yields the following equilibrium values
wCi (r ,m) =
mi
2 (r + M) (14)
πCi (r ,m) =
1
8
mi (2r + M)
(r + M)2 (15)




(r + M)2 (16)
πC (r ,m) =
n∑
j=1
πCj (r ,m) + πCR (r ,m) =
1
16
(2r + 3M) (2r + M)
(r + M)2 (17)
pC (r ,m) = 2r + 3M
4 (r + M) .




> 0 so that owners with the largest bargaining power achieve the highest
component price as expected. The product price is increasing in mi and decreasing in
r . The stronger the owners are in the negotiations, the higher the component price
which pushes up the final product price, lowering consumer welfare in the product
market.
It is straightforward to verify the following result, where the full expression for
m+i (n, r , M−i ) is given in the “Appendix”:9
Proposition 1 With full participation in the bargaining group, πC (r ,m) > π I and
πCR (r ,m) > π
I
R. Owners with sufficiently low bargaining power prefer I :
π Ii > π
C
i (r ,m) ⇔ m+i (n, r , M−i ) > mi
8 In all cases, the disagreement payoff is set to zero. This corresponds to Laussel (2008), reflecting the fact
that all component owners must agree for the final good to be produced.
9 Where M−i = M − mi .
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The bargaining solution increases industry and retailer profit compared to a situation
with non-cooperative price setting by the component holding monopolies. For a given
distribution of the m, it is clear that an owner with a larger bargaining power gains a
larger profit than his rivals. Hence, some owners may prefer the bargaining solution
whilst others gain most profit from the non-cooperative framework. This suggests that
one should seek to determine which component owners will be in a (stable) bargaining
group, and which stay outside. We turn to this issue now.
3 Partial bargaining
Component owners with sufficiently low bargaining power would prefer to set their
intermediate price non-cooperatively to maximize own profit, whereas those with high
bargaining power prefer the cooperative framework. Here we explore the possibility
that one group bargains with the retailer over their component price, while others fix
their payment non-cooperatively outside of this agreement. Let B represent the set of
owners that bargain with the retailer, and N the set that does not; assume that there are
β ≥ 1 members in B and n −β in N . Component prices are determined groupwise in
sequence. In case N B, the non-bargaining group sets its component prices first with
each owner maximizing his own profit; these component prices are revealed and the
members of the bargaining group set their prices bymaximizing the Nash product with
the retailer. The order of negotiation is reversed in case BN where members of the
bargaining group set component prices tomaximize theNash productwithout knowing
the choice of those who are outside of this group; then the outside owners observe
the intermediate prices set, and choose their own component price to maximize own
profit. In case SI M , both groups set their component price simultaneously, without
knowing the choice of the other group.
Fix a membership for each group; for those who bargain, it is both the number of
members and their bargaining strengths that are important and let the sumof bargaining
power for this group be μ = ∑i mi for i ∈ B. The next lemma gives the profits
achieved by the component owners that are part of the bargaining group and those who
are not, depending on the order of play in the cases outlined above. For completeness,
expressions for intermediate prices, final product price and the profit of the retailer are
given in the “Appendix”.
Lemma 3 Fix a membership for each group B and N. The realized profits for compo-




mi (2r + μ)











(r + μ)2 (1 + n − β) , i ∈ B (20)
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, j ∈ N (24)









πN B = π BN = 1
16
(2r + μ) (2r + 3μ + 4 (n − β) (r + μ))
(r + μ)2 (1 + n − β)2 (26)
π SI M = 1
4
(2r + μ) (2r + 3μ + 2 (n − β) (2r + μ))
(2 (r + μ) + (n − β) (2r + μ))2 . (27)
Note that industry and retailer profit is the same in each of the sequential frameworks
due to the fact that these magnitudes are only dependent on the sum of component
prices (see (7)); the “Appendix” shows that this sum is identical in case N B and BN .
In order to be able to compare the different frameworks, we must assume the same
distribution of component owners and bargaining powers, i.e. that n > β ≥ 1 and μ
is the same in each case N B, BN and SI M .10 Comparison of the profit expressions
is straightforward:
Proposition 2 Fix a membership of N and B with n > β ≥ 1. Then
π SI M > πN B = π BN ; πCR (r ,m) > π SI MR > πN BR = π BNR
π SI M > π I ; π SI MR > π IR
πN B = π BN > (<)π I and πN BR = π BNR > (<) π IR f or and
r > (<)
μ (1 + n − 2β)
2β
(28)




i , i ∈ B
πN Bj > π
BN
j , j ∈ N
πN Bj > π
SI M
j f or n − β = 1 , j ∈ N
πN Bj < π
SI M
j f or n − β ≥ 2 , j ∈ N .
For the component owners who are in the bargaining group, there is a first-mover
advantage, and they prefer to set intermediate price before the outsiders. The worst
10 These variables will be determined endogenously in the next section. When β = n, then soultion C (full
bargaining) obtains, and when β = 0 the independent solution (I ) occurs.
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outcome for the bargaining group is achieved when they set component price after the
profit-maximizing outsiders; profits from the simultaneous framework lie in between
the two sequential ones. The component owners who are outside of the bargaining
group prefer to set their component price first rather than second. Unless there is a
single member of N , most profit is obtained from the simultaneous framework. First
best for a component owner who is the only one to set price independently, is to
set price first, and then let the other actors bargain over the division of what is left.
However, if two or more owners want to set price independently, they earn from the
simultaneous setup where each group moderates its claim due to the uncertainty of
what the other group will do. This gives the largest pie to be shared out in terms of
total profit as can be seen from Proposition 2, and is also the preferred framework of
the retailer. Of course, the simultaneous framework with β = n is identical the the
pure bargaining solution (C).
Note that the profit comparisons of the industry as a whole and the retailer are
perfectly aligned, and that the profits accruing fromboth sequential frameworks are the
same for retailer (and at the industry level) since they give the same sum of component
prices. Whether the retailer would prefer a sequential framework to the one in which
component owners set price independently is parameter specific, usually dependent
on a large enough bargaining power of the retailer compared to the bargaining group.
In one specific case, however, the distribution of bargaining powers does not play a
part:11
Corollary 1 When β > 1+n2 , then π
N B = π BN > π I and πN BR = π BNR > π IR
independent of bargaining power.
Industry and retailer profit are larger in the sequential framework compared to the
independent when over half the component owners bargain, whatever the distribution
of the bargaining powers.12
4 Designingmarket structure
The retailer achieves different profit outcomes depending on the structure that is put
in place, with his best solution being the one in which all component owners bargain
simultaneously over intermediate prices (case C—see Propositions 1 and 2). Suppose
initially that the intermediate prices are set by the owners independently, so that case
I is the status quo. Howmight the retailer set about achieving a solution that improves
his own profit? In the absence of the power to dictate that the full bargaining solution
will be chosen, we consider other options available to the retailer in designing this
market. Suppose that the retailer can only choose a regime N B, BN , or SI M before the
intermediate prices are set, and does not have the power to dictate to which group, N or
B, a component ownerwill belong.Having announced a regime, the component owners
11 In the condition r > μ(1+n−2β)2β , the right-side is negative—and hence the inequality is always
fulfilled—under the condition in the Corollary.
12 Suppose that r = 1; then rearranging the condition in (28) gives β > μ(1+n)2(1+μ) , where the right-hand-
side reaches 1+n2 in the limit as μ grows. Hence, the condition is fulfilled independent of bargaining power
whenever at least half of the owners are in the bargaining group for this case.
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choose membership of the bargaining or non-bargaining group, and then prices are
determined. Hence, the component owners find their way into an agreement in which
some of them bargain over the component price, whilst others set it independently
to maximize own profit. To narrow down the set of possible agreements, and final
outcomes, we now determine under which conditions such an agreement can be stable.
We require both internal and external stability in the sense ofD’Aspremont et al. (1983)
in the presence of heterogenous players that differ in their bargaining power. Consider
a situation inwhich there are n−β members of group N andβ in group B characterized
by the vector of bargaining power m̃. For internal stability, it cannot be the case that
any of the members in B can join group N and increase its own profit:
πi∈B (β, m̃) ≥ πi∈N (β − 1, m̃−i ) (29)
where m̃−i is the vector of bargaining powers of those in B apart from i . At the same
time, external stability demands that it cannot be profitable for a member of group N
to join the group of bargainers:
π j∈N (β, m̃) ≥ π j∈B
(
β + 1, m̃,m j
)
. (30)
When (29) and (30) are both fulfilled, the bargaining group is stable.
The game thus proceeds as follows:
Stage 1. The retailer announces theorder of negotiation from the set {N B, BN , SI M}.
Stage 2. The component owners form groups B and N .
Stage 3. Component prices are determined and production takes place.
The retailer attempts to design the market by announcing a negotiation framework,
and the profit outcome will depend on how component owners select into group B and
N . Moving away from the status quo (case I ) depends upon finding a stable coalition
within the framework announced by the retailer. To examine the optimal choice of the
retailer, we now proceed by ordering component owners according to their bargaining
power, m1 > m2 > · · · > mn , and normalizing the bargaining power of the retailer to
one: r = 1. At stage 2, situations may arise in which several groupings of component
owners can be stable, i.e. there is not a unique bargaining group.Denote by B = {∅} the
empty bargaining group, which hence represents the status quo solution. If B = {∅}
is one of several stable bargaining groups, then we assume that the status quo of case
I persists. With this assumption, the next proposition shows that the retailer cannot
move away from the status quo by announcing order of negotiation N B or SI M .
Proposition 3 (i). When the retailer announces negotiation order N B, then B = {∅}
is the unique stable bargaining group. (ii). Suppose the retailer announces negotiation
order SI M. I. For n ≥ 3, then B = {∅} is the unique stable bargaining group. II.
When n = 2, B = {∅} is always a stable bargaining group, although it may not be
unique.
The only stable solution when the bargaining group sets component price second,
will be for all owners to set price independently to maximize own profit. This is shown
in the “Appendix” to be internally stable, and is trivially externally stable since there
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are no owners left to break into the group N . Hence the realized profits for each
component owner and the retailer are given by the independent profit-maximizing
solution in (9) and (10). The final goods price is pI in (12).
Recall that simultaneous component price setting and bargaining is the framework
that maximizes industry profit for a given distribution of component owners in the two
groups; Proposition 3, however indicates that this is not a framework that the owners
will converge to of their own free will. When there are more than two components, any
coalition involving some of the owners in the bargaining group will be unstable. The
component owner with the lowest bargaining power can always do better by moving
to the group that sets price independently. The profit of this owner from bargaining is
by (23) falling in the collective bargaining power of the other component owners in
group B, so that the component with lowest power is most tempted to leave. In this
case, the simultaneous framework yields a realized profit to the component owners
from the independent solution I in (9) and (10). When there are only two components,
an outcome in which both component owners belong to N is stable. It may, however,
not be the unique outcome, and the “Appendix” shows that B = {1, 2} is stable if the
bargaining power of each component owner is large in relation to that of the retailer
(normalized to 1), and that m2 is sufficiently close to m1 in order for 2 to stay in the
coalition. Given the assumption that a bargaining group does not form if B = {∅} is
stable, announcing SI M as the order of negotiation will give the status quo solution.
The only candidate for achieving a profit level other than that associated with the
status quo is then for the retailer to announce structure BN . As long as the owner with
largest bargaining power has sufficient strength, the empty bargaining set is not stable,
and it may be feasible to move away from status quo solution I .
Proposition 4 If m1 > 2n−1 then B = {∅} is not a stable bargaining group in frame-
work BN.
When the component owner with the largest bargaining power is sufficiently influ-
ential, he will break out of the coalition with all owners in N , rendering it internally
unstable. This means that the retailer, by announcing this order of negotiations, can
move the solution away from the status quo, towards BN which gives more profit if
the condition in (28) is fulfilled. The highest level of profit for the retailer is case C
when all owners are in the bargaining set. To what extent it is possible to enforce this
solution by announcing negotiation structure BN is the subject of the next proposition.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the retailer announces order of negotiation BN.Thegrand
coalition B = {1, 2, . . . , n} is not stable for n ≥ 4.
Although the grand coalition, and solution C , is not attainable with four or more
component holders, we demonstrate below the existence of a bargaining set that is
not complete but is profit-improving for the retailer. First, we turn attention to the
special case of n = 2 to demonstrate that partial bargaining may be feasible for the
retailer to implement, but that this is not necessarily desirable. For this case, the proof
of Proposition 4 shows that both component owners setting their prices independently
is a stable solution for 2 > m1. Owner 2, with the lower bargaining power, has most
to gain from leaving the grand bargaining coalition B = {1, 2}; using (20) and (21), 2
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2 + m1 + m2




4 (1 + m1)2
> 0
which can be solved to show that owner 2 stays in the grand coalition if m2 >
m̂2 (m1) = (m1 + 2) 2
√
m1(m1+1)3−m1(1+m1)
m1(3m1+4) . The situation is depicted in Fig. 1,where
we are interested in the area below the 45-degree line since owner 1 has the larger
bargaining power.
Notice first, that when 2 > m1 and m̂2 (m1) > m2 (area I) the bargaining set is
empty. However, even though 2 > m1 , this is not the only possible outcome for a
stable coalition as there is a small area in which 2 > m1 > m2 > m̂2 (m1), so that
both component owners bargaining and both setting price independently are stable
coalitions (area II). When both set prices independently, 1 has the larger incentive to
break out but does not in this area. When both bargain, 2 has the larger incentive to
leave, but does not. Whenm1 > 2 , owner 1 prefers to bargain, being joined by 2 when
m2 > m̂2 (m1) (area III), and remaining alone when not (IV). Since the status quo is
stable in areas I and II of Fig. 1, the retailer does not gain from announcing BN as the
order of negotiations. In area III, both players bargaining in the grand coalition is the
unique outcome, and solution C obtains, improving the profit of the retailer beyond
the status quo. Sustaining this is the “threat” that any player who breaks out of the
agreement will have to set component price after those who remain in the bargaining
group. In area IV, a partial bargaining solution is the unique outcome where owner 1
bargains his component price first, and then owner 2 chooses his profit-maximizing
price. With r = 1, μ = m1, n = 2 and β = 1, the condition in (28) guaranteeing that
π BNR > π
I
R is 2 > m1, a contradiction. Hence for n = 2, the retailer benefits from
announcing order of negotiations BN when the bargaining powers fall in area III of
Fig. 1, but allowing the status quo to continue otherwise.
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When n > 2 component holders, the formation of a unique bargaining group is not
guaranteed and hence the retailer cannot be certain which combination of component
owners will form if he announces BN as the order of negotiation, and can therefore
not know whether this is profit improving compared to the independent solution. As
an example, suppose n = 3, m1 = 2.5, m2 = 2.3 , m3 = 1.75; then the coalitions
B = {1, 2} and B = {1, 3} are both internally and externally stable and give the retailer
more profit than the independent solution. The retailer gets the most profit when the
sum of the bargaining powers in the bargaining group is lowest, i.e. when B = {1, 3}.
In order to achieve formation of a unique coalition,we can either change the stability
requirements, or the manner in which the coalition forms. In the following analysis,
we assume that the conditions for internal and external coalition stability remain
unchanged, but that component owners consider entry into the coalition sequentially.
Specifically, we assume sequential entry according to size of bargaining power, where
component owner 1 first decides whether to enter group B or not; having observed
whether 1 enters the coalition, 2 decides whether or not to enter, followed in sequence
by 3 and so on. Given this sequential entry, the proof of Proposition 4 states that a
bargaining groupwill exist as longm1 > 2n−1 since this guarantees that owner 1 would
rather bargain alone with the retailer than set component price independently. Given
that owner 1 has entered the bargaining group, component owner 2 (with m2 < m1)
then compares the profit from joining the coalition with that of remaining outside of
it. If he decides to join then the bargaining group consisting solely of owner 1 is not
externally stable; furthermore, if 2 decides to join the bargaining group, 1 will not
want to leave since the payoff from bargaining is increasing in bargaining power. This
means that the coalition consisting of 1 and 2 is internally stable. Should owner 3
(m3 < m2) decide not to join 1 and 2, then no players later in the sequence will wish
to join either. Then B = {1, 2} is internally and externally stable. Hence, we can find a
unique stable coalition by identifying a player k = {1, 2, . . . , n} such that this player
enters the bargaining group, but k + 1 does not. The retailer can identify the stable
bargaining group given n component owners, and then compare its profit to the case
of independent profit maximization.




2 + μ−k + mk






(1 + μ−k) (1 + n − (k − 1))
)2
(31)
where μ−k = ∑k−1i=1 mi . This can further be reduced to 0 < , where
 =
(
(μ−k + 1)2 (n − k)2 + μ−k (3μ−k + 4) (1 + n − k)
)
m2k
+ (μ−k + 2) (μ−k + 1)
(
(n − k)2 (μ−k + 1) + 2μ−k (1 + n − k)
)
mk
− (μ−k + 2)2 (μ−k + 1)2 (1 + n − k) (32)
which is convex in mk with positive slope and negative value at mk = 0. Hence, k
joins the bargaining group as long as mk is larger than the positive root of  = 0. In
the “Appendix” this is given in its closed form, but here we write the positive root as
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Fig. 2 Stable bargaining group in case BN with sequential entry
m+ (μ−k, n, k). Each critical value for mk is associated with one of the level curves
in Fig. 2. Owner 1 enters the bargaining group as long as m1 > m+ (0, n, 1) = 2n−1 .
Owner 2 then has to have anm2 which is belowm−1 but abovem+ (μ−2 = m1, n, 2);
this is clearly true in Fig. 2, so owner 2 enters the bargaining group. For entry of owner
3 requires m2 > m3 > m+ (μ−3, n, 3), but this cannot occur as drawn in Fig. 2 for
μ−3 = m1 + m2. Hence, the stable bargaining group here is B = {1, 2}.
Figure 2 also demonstrates the monotonicity of the entry decision in the bargaining
power, since the demand on this parameter is higher for each owner that enters. Also
drawn in Fig. 2 is m+ (μn−1, n, n − 1) which is the level that the owner with the
lowest bargaining power (mn) must have to enter and make up the grand coalition
of all component owners. The dashed lines drawn represent the average bargaining
power of the bargaining group before owner k makes his decision. Due to entry in
sequence of falling bargaining power, it must be the case that μ−kk−1 > mk . The proof
of Proposition 5 shows that the curve m+ (μn−1, n, n − 1) always lies above μ−nn−1 for
n ≥ 4, ruling out the grand coalition in these cases.
As long asm1 > 2n−1 , the retailer can announce BN as the order of negotiations, and
be sure that a unique stable bargaining group will form given sequential entry in order
of rising bargaining power. However, this may not always be profitable compared to
the solution in which all owners set their component prices independently. The retailer
knows the number of component owners and their bargaining power and can hence
calculate the bargaining group that will arise; he then needs to check whether (28)
is fulfilled to be sure that announcing BN will be a profitable strategy or not. As a
demonstration, we suppose more structure on the bargaining powers by supposing
that m1 is largest and each successive power declines at a constant rate δ so mk =
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Fig. 3 Stable and profitable bargaining groups: a numerical example
δk−1m1, μ−k = ∑k−1j=1m j = m1 ∑k−1j=1 δ j−1 = m1 (1−δk−1)(1−δ) .13 Then owner k in the
sequence enters the bargaining group as long as (31) is fulfilled; using (28), given that
there are k members of the bargaining group, this is profitable for the retailer if
k >
μk (1 + n)
2 (μk + 1) .
Figure 3 illustrates a numerical example in which m1 = 1.5 and δ = 0.75. For
each n, owner k joins the bargaining group above and to the left of the whole line,
and bargaining groups below the dashed line give the retailer more profit than the
independent solution. When n = 2, the bargaining set is empty (since m1 = 1.5 <
2
n−1 = 2 in this case). For n = 3, owner 1 joins the bargaining group, but 2 does
not; this is profitable for the retailer. When there are four, five or six owners, both 1
and 2 join the bargaining group;14 however, the retailer profits from this only if the
number of owners is four or five. With seven owners, the stable bargaining group of
B = {1, 2, 3} forms, and givesmore profit to the retailer than the independent solution.
From n ≥ 8, no stable bargaining groups are profitable for the retailer.
As m1 falls, but with the same δ, more combinations of bargaining groups are
profitable for the retailer, but fewer bargaining groups form. For example if m1 = 1,
then B = {1, 2} is a stable coalition for n = 6, and is profitable for the retailer. In
13 In a model of sequential bilateral bargaining, Xiao (2018) orders players according to their valuations of
striking a bargain, and derives conditions on neighbouring values that secure the existence of an equilibrium
in his model.
14 Note that n = 6, k = 3 lies to the right of the whole line so that owner 3 does not join the bargaining
group.
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contrast B = {1, 2, 3} is still profitable for the retailer, but no longer stable for n = 7.
When the bargaining power of the owners increases, indicated by a rise in m1 and/or
δ, less bargaining groups are profitable for the retailer to try to implement, but more
bargaining groups are stable.
The retailer may then be able to use the order of negotiations in order to move away
from the status quo solution, I . However, even in the case in which a great deal of
structure is placed on the group formation problem, the stable groups that arise may
not be profitable for the retailer to implement.
5 Conclusion
We have considered a simple vertical industry in which a retailer combines comple-
mentary components to make a final product. Initially, all component owners set their
intermediate price to maximize own profit, and our focus has been on whether group
bargaining has the potential to increase industry and retailer profit above the status
quo level. By allowing the bargaining group to negotiate its component prices first,
the retailer can encourage the endogenous formation of a stable bargaining group in
which no component owner wants to leave, and no outside component owner finds
it profitable to enter. Furthermore, the retailer can use this framework to increase
his own profit. When there are four or more component holders, the retailer can-
not implement his first-best, fully cooperative solution in which all owners join the
bargaining group. However, we present conditions under which a stable bargaining
group consisting of some owners will arise, and when this increases the profit of the
retailer.
Our results build upon several simplifying assumptions that can be relaxed in future
work. First, we have assumed that each component is essential in the production of the
final good.Differentiated bargaining powers can capture the fact that some components
might be more valuable than others (in the sense of having a better outside option).
Hence, in the production of the final good, a more general formulation would allow
for the fact that some inputs are essential whilst others are not. Heinzel and Hoof
(2020) considered various degrees of input differentiation. Second, the bargaining
framework that we have assumed is stylized in the sense that all of those belonging
to the bargaining group negotiate with the retailer at the same time, maximizing the
Nash product. An alternative would be to consider each member of the bargaining
group negotiating bilaterally with the retailer, without knowing the result of other
deals (Nash-in-Nash bargaining as discussed by Collard-Wexler et al. 2019). Third,
we have assumed the endogenous formation of a single bargaining group, but in
practice several alliances may form in the supply chain. Given this, there is also
scope for investigating the order of negotiations between different bargaining groups,
and how this affects market profits. A similar situation was considered in Clark and
Pereau (2009) in which bargaining was assumed to happen in an alternating offers
framework.
Funding Open Access funding provided by UiT The Arctic University of Norway (incl University Hospital
of North Norway).
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6 Appendix
Lemma 1






w j − wi = 0.
The unique solution to this system is wi = w I = 11+n . The second-order condition
for a maximum is fulfilled since ∂
2πi
∂w2i
= −2 < 0. Profits and product price are
recovered by substitution. 
Lemma 2








− (2r + M)
1 − W
)
= 0, i = 1, . . . , n.
Clearly, amaximumwill not involve = 0, ruling out solutions inwhich eachwi = 0,
or W = 1. The bracketed expression is then zero, giving
wi = mi (1 − W )
2r + M (33)
which can be summed for all owners to reveal the sum of the component prices as
W = M
2 (r + M) . (34)
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Inserting (34) into (33) reveals the expression for each component price as wCi as

































= −4 (r + M)
2
2r + M 
(





= −4 (r + M)
2
2r + M 
when evaluated at wCi . Hence, around the equilibrium,
H = 4 (r + M)
2


















. . . . −1







The determinant of the k′th principal minor (k = 1, . . . , n) is
Dk = (−1)
k (2r + M)k−1∏k
j=1m j
⎛





which is positive (negative) for even (odd) k so that the Hessian is negative definite at
the equilibrium, implying that the solution characterizes a local maximum.
Expressions for price and profit are recovered by substitution. 
Proposition 1
Proof The first comparisons are straightforward. For component owner i , we have
π Ii − πCi (r ,m) =
1





2r + M−i + mi
)
(




− (n + 3) (n − 1)m2i +
((
7 − 2n − n2
)
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The numerator of this expression is a strictly concave function ofmi , with negative
slope and positive value atmi = 0. It follows that the numerator has one positive root,
m+i (n, r , M−i ), and thatπ Ii > π
C
i (r ,m) form
+
i (n, r , M−i ) > mi . Direct calculation
gives
m+i (n, r , M−i ) =
(
7 − 2n − n2) M−i




(n + 1)2 M2−i + 4r (n + 3) (n − 1) M−i + 4r2 (n + 3) (n − 1)
2 (n + 3) (n − 1)

Lemma 3
Proof (i) Case N B. Let the intermediate prices set in the first round by j ∈ N be given
by w j , and consider the decisions of actors i ∈ B; furthermore, let ωN = ∑w j for


















− (2r + μ)




wk = mk (1 − ωB − ωN )
2r + μ (36)
Summing (36) across all members of B yields
ωB = μ (1 − ωB − ωN )
2r + μ
which implies that the sum of all component prices for group B is
ωB = μ (1 − ωN )
2 (r + μ) . (37)
Inserting (37) into (36) gives the component price for each bargaining patent owner
as a function of the (sum of) the prices set at the first stage:
wk = mk (1 − ωN )
2 (r + μ) , k ∈ B. (38)
The second-order conditions for the maximization of the Nash program are fulfilled;
showing this is analagous to the proof of Lemma 2, and is omitted here.
123
Group bargaining in supply chains 131
Consider now the decisions made at the first stage by the component owners j ∈ N
to maximize
π j = 1
2
w j (1 − ωB − ωN )
where one must recall that the choice variable appears indirectly in ωB through (38),
and directly in ωN . The first-order condition for a maximum is
∂π j
∂w j
= (1 − ωB − ωN ) + w j
(
μ
2 (r + μ) − 1
)
= 0.
This system has a unique solution, and this is symmetric:
wN Bj =
1
1 + n − β , j ∈ N . (39)
The second order condition for j ′smaximization is fulfilled since ∂
2π j
∂w2j
= − 2r+μr+μ < 0.
Using (39) in (38) gives the final reduced expression for the component prices set
by the members of B:
wN Bk =
mk
2 (r + μ) (1 + n − β) , k ∈ B (40)
Inserting (39) and (40) into (4) gives the product price as
pN B = 2 (r + μ) (1 + 2 (n − β)) + μ
4 (r + μ) (1 + n − β)
Given the product price set by the retailer, the profits of the component owners and
retailer are given by (5) and (6). Using (39) and (40) reveals the final profits of the
actors as given in Lemma 3 by equations (22) and (18). In the calculation of πN B ,
the profit of the group that bargains is given by 18
μ(2r+μ)
(r+μ)2(1+n−β)2 , and for group N by
(n − β) 14 2r+μ(r+μ)(1+n−β)2 ; these are added to the profit of the retailer to get the final
expression (26).
(ii) Case BN is proved in a similar manner, yielding
wBNk =
mk
2 (r + μ), k ∈ B
wBNj =
2r + μ
2 (r + μ) (1 + n − β) , j ∈ N
pBN = 2 (r + μ) (1 + 2 (n − β)) + μ
4 (r + μ) (1 + n − β)
and the payoffs (20), (22) and (26).
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(iii) Case SI M gives
wSI Mk =
mk
2 (r + μ) + (n − β) (μ + 2r) , k ∈ B
wSI Mj =
2r + μ
2 (r + μ) + (n − β) (μ + 2r) , j ∈ N
pSIM = 2 ((r + μ) + (n − β) (μ + 2r)) + μ
2 (2 (r + μ) + (n − β) (μ + 2r))
and the payoffs (23)–(25) and (27). 
Proposition 2
Proof The profit comparisons are mostly straightforward. For the component owners
who are outside of the bargaining group, notice that




2 (r + μ)
2r + μ > n − β, for j ∈ N





2]. Hence, if group N is a single
component owner ( n − β = 1), then it prefers N B to SI M ; when there are at least
two members in N , then they would prefer the framework in which the two groups set
component prices simultaneously.
For the comparison of πCR and π
SI M
R , note that
πCR (r ,m) − π SI MR =
χυ
16 (M + r)2 2 (r + μ) + (n − β) (2r + μ)2
with
χ = (μ (n − β) + 2r (n − β − 1)) M + 2r (μ (n − β + 1) + 2r (n − β)) > 0
υ = (μ (n − β + 4) + 2r (n − β + 3)) M + 2r (μ (n − β + 3) + 2r (n − β + 2)) > 0
since n − β is at least 1 under the conditions of the Proposition. 
Proposition 3
Proof Part (i)
1. In the status quo, all component owners set price independently, each earning
(9). Suppose that owner j moves to group B, leaving n − 1 in group N . This
gives a profit increase to j which using (18) and (19) when μ and β are zero is
m j
(




1 + m j
)2 n2 −
1
2 (1 + n)2 =
−
(
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which is obviously negative since n ≥ 2. Hence no component owner would
want to be the only firm to bargain alone, and the solution with all n owners in
N is internally stable.
2. Suppose that a group of β component owners are in group B, with n − β in
group N . Let μ−i be sum of all bargaining powers in B except owner i . From
(19) and (18), i wants to stay in B if his payoff by belonging to group B of size
β exceeds his payoff when he moves to group N of size n − β + 1
1
8
mi (2 + μ−i + mi )




(1 + μ−i ) (2 + n − β)2
> 0
which can be shown to hold for
0 >  (mi , μ−i , n, β)
where
 (mi , μ−i , n, β) =
(
(3 (n − β) + 4) (n − β) +
(





+ (n − β) (2 + μ−i ) (1 + μ−i ) (3 (n − β) + 4)mi
+2 (2 + μ−i ) (1 + μ−i )2 (n − β + 1)2
Suppose first that n − β ≥ 2, which makes  (mi , μ−i , n, β) a convex function of
mi with a positive slope and positive value at mi = 0. Hence,  (mi , μ−i , n, β) > 0,
and i wants to leave the bargaining group, rendering it unstable.
Suppose that n − β = 1. If 7 > μ−i , then  (mi , μ−i , n − β = 1) is still a convex
function, and the previous analysis holds. If 7 < μ−i , then  (mi , μ−i , n − β = 1) is




(1 + μ−i ) 14 + 7μ−i + 3
√
(9μ−i − 14) (2 + μ−i )
μ−i − 7
Note that the threshold that mi must exceed in order for i to stay in the bargaining
group is larger than μ−i since
1
2
(1 + μ−i ) 14 + 7μ−i + 3
√
(9μ−i − 14) (2 + μ−i )
μ−i − 7 − μ−i
= 1
2
35μ−i + 14 + 5μ2−i + 3 (μ−i + 1)
√
(9μ−i − 14) (2 + μ−i )
μ−i − 7 > 0.
Suppose that component owner i has the lowest bargaining power in group B . In
order to remain in the group it must have a power which exceeds a threshold value,
which in turn is larger than the sum of all other bargaining powers in the group. Since
i has the lowest bargaining power, this cannot hold, and firm i wishes to leave the
bargaining group, making it unstable.
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Suppose finally that β = n, so that the bargaining group is now the grand coalition
of all component owners. Owner i stays in the coalition if 0 >  (mi , μ−i , n = β),
which holds for mi > 1μ−i (1 + μ−i )
√
μ−i (2 + μ−i ) > μ−i , a contradiction for the
component holder with the lowest bargaining power in the group. This owner will
always want to leave the grand coalition, rendering it unstable.
Hence B = {∅} is the uniquely stable coalition and solution I , with all owners
setting price independently, ensues.
Part (ii)
1. Suppose all are in N (i.e. β = 0), component owner i has no incentive to break
out and bargain as a singleton—using (23)—if:
1





(2 (1 + mi ) + (n − 1) (2 + mi ))2
= 2n
2 + (n2 − 1)mi
(n + 1)2 (mi + 2n + nmi )2
> 0
which is true. Hence the coalition with all component owners in N is internally
stable (and trivially externally stable).
2. Suppose that there is a coalition of β ∈ [1, n−1] component owners in B, with
the remainder in N . Using (23) and (24), consider owner i who has the lowest
bargaining power in the group. It will stay in this coalition as long as
mi (2 + μ−i + mi )
(2 (1 + μ−i + mi ) + (n − β) (2 + μ−i + mi ))2
− (2 + μ−i )
2
(2 (1 + μ−i ) + (n − β + 1) (2 + μ−i ))2
> 0
where μ−i is the sum of all bargaining powers except for i . This condition can
be reduced to the following expression
(mi , μ−i , n, β) > 0
where
(mi , μ−i , n, β)
= μ−i (2 (2 + μ−i ) (n − β) + 5μ−i + 8)m2i
− (μ−i + 2) (4 (n − β) (μ−i + 1) (n − β + 2)
+μ2−i
(
2 (n − β) + (n − β)2 − 1
))
mi
− (μ−i + 2)2 ((2 + μ−i ) (n − β) + 2 (μ−i + 1))2
which is quadratic and convex in mi , with negative slope and value at mi = 0.
Hence the equation (mi , μ−i , n, β) = 0 has one positive root m (μ−i , n, β),
and the value of mi must be above this for (mi , μ−i , n, β) > 0. It can be
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shown that that m (μ−i , n, β) is strictly increasing in n − β (the number of
members in N ), and at the minimum value of m (μ−i , n, β) (which occurs for
n − β = 1) we have m (μ−i , n − β = 1) > μ−i .15
Since we have defined mi to be the lowest bargaining power in the group it is
impossible that this is larger than the sum of the bargaining powers of all other
members, and hence component owner i wants to leave the bargaining group
rendering it unstable.
3. Suppose finally that all component owners belong to the bargaining group
(β = n). The analysis frompart (ii) 2 above is still valid here, and the component
owner (by definition owner n) with the lowest bargaining power will want to
stay in the grand coalition as long as
mn > m (μ−n, β = n) = (μ−n + 2)
(
(3μ−n + 4) √μ−n (9μ−n + 8) − μ2−n
)
(2μ−n) (5μ−n + 8)
Consider the value of m (μ−n, β = n) in relation to the average bargaining
power of all component owners except n, μ−nn−1 :
m (μ−n, β = n) − μ−n
n − 1
which can be shown to be positive for
n >
(μ−n + 2) (3μ−n + 4) √(8 + 9μ−n) μ−n + (14 + 9μ−n) μ2−n
(μ−n + 2)
(
(4 + 3μ−n) √(8 + 9μ−n) μ−n − μ2−n
) .
The right hand side of this expression is an increasing, concave function inμ−n
that takes values in the range (1, 2.25). Hence for n ≥ 3, component owner n
will not leave the grand coalition as long as mn > m (μ−n, β = n), but since
m (μ−n, β = n) − μ−nn−1 , this implies mn > μ−nn−1 . The bargaining power of the
weakest component owner must be larger than the average of all the other
component owners’ bargaining power, a contradiction. Hence there is no stable
grand coalition for n ≥ 3. Combining (ii) 1., 2., and 3. proves that B = {∅} for
n ≥ 3, and all owners set intermediate prices independently, giving solution I .
4. When n = 2, we can calculate directly from (23) and (24) that firm 2 with the




2 + m1 + m2




(2 (1 + m1) + (2 + m1))2
> 0
15 We can show that m
(







(n − β) (μ−i + 2)2 ((n − β) + 2) − μ2−i + (3μ−i + 4 + 2 (n − β) + (n − β) μ−i )√ζ
μ−i
(
4 (n − β) + 5μ−i + 2 (n − β) μ−i + 8
)
with ζ = (n − β) (μ−i + 2) (2 (n − β) + 6μ−i + (n − β) μ−i ) + μ−i (9μ−i + 8).
123
136 D. J. Clark, J.-C. Pereau





Owner 2 wants to stay in the coalition for m1 > m2 > m (m1, β = n = 2).
It is straightforward to verify that also 1 remains in the coalition for these
combinations of bargaining powers. Hence for these values of m1,m2, B =
{1, 2} is a stable coalition, and solution C can be achieved. Part (ii) 1 of the
proof shows that B = {∅} is also stable, and that a singleton in the bargaining
set is not. 
Proposition 4
Proof If all n component owners belong to N , then using (20) and (9) the increase in





(1 + mi )2 n
− 1
2 (1 + n)2 =
1
8
(2n + (n − 1)mi ) (n − 1)mi − 2
n (1 + mi )2 (n + 1)2
which is positive for mi > 2n−1 . If this holds for m1 which is the highest bargaining
power, then the owner will have an incentive to leave N , making it unstable. 
Proposition 5
Proof Suppose that all component owners are in the bargaining group. Let the sum
of all owners’ bargaining power except actor n be given by μ−n . The component
owner with the lowest bargaining power, mn , has no incentive to leave the group




2 + μ−n + mn




4 (1 + μ−n)2
> 0.
This holds if  (μ−n,mn) > 0, where
 (μ−n ,mn) = μ−n (3μ−n + 4)m2n + 2μ−n (μ−n + 2) (μ−n + 1)mn − (μ−n + 2)2 (μ−n + 1)2 .
 (μ−n,mn) is convex in mn , with a positive slope and negative value at mn = 0.
Hence,  (μ−n,mn) > 0 and component owner n will stay in the bargaining group if
mn is larger than the positive root of  (μ−n,mn) = 0, given by
m̃n (μ−n) = (μ−n + 2)




μ−n (μ−n + 1)3 − μ−n (1 + μ−n)
)
.
Consider the relation between m̃n (μ−n) and the average bargaining power of all in
the bargaining group except n, μ−nn−1 which—by definition—must be larger than mn .
If m̃n (μ−n) > μ−nn−1 , then component owner n will leave the bargaining group since
staying in would require mn > m̃n (μ−n) > μ−nn−1 , a contradiction. It can be verified
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that m̃n (μ−n) > μ−nn−1 if
n >
(
2 (μ−n + 2)
√
μ−n (μ−n + 1)3 + μ−n
(
μ−n + 2μ2−n − 2
))
(
2 (μ−n + 2)
√
μ−n (μ−n + 1)3 − μ−n (μ−n + 2) (μ−n + 1)
) .
The right hand side is concave and increasing in μ−n , converging to 4 from below as
μ−n gets large. Hence m̃n (μ−n) > μ−nn−1 for n ≥ 4, and firm n would withdraw from
the grand coalition. 
Roots of = 0 in caseBN
Consider  in (32); it is more convenient to exclude a parameter in deriving Fig. 2
by writing x = n − k which is the number of owners outside of the bargaining group






























)2 x2 + μ−k (3μ−k + 4) (x + 1)) (μ−k + 2)2 (μ−k + 1)2 (x + 1) .
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